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Abstract 
We investigate the causes of a conflict by adding ambient climate factors to the existing 
bundle of most significant variables. It turns out that – controlling for possible associations 
– temperature could actually induce a conflict. We emphasise that temperature could not be 
a dominant reason in starting a conflict; however, it could escalate the chances when other 
factors are present. This paper references some of the related psychological studies to 
support this claim. We also show that grievance factors could actually be rightfully effective 
in starting an internal conflict alongside greed based reasons. In the end, we believe that it 
could be informative to study ambient factors more often in economics. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Civil wars and internal conflicts have always made interesting discussion subjects for mass 
media however, academics – from diverse fields – have shown interest to this matter as 
well. The ambiguous nature of this phenomenon challenged many scholars to figure out the 
mechanism behind it. Until a while ago, empirical study on armed conflicts was only taken 
on by political scientists but recently, scholars from other fields showed interest in this 
subject as well. The body of our work links the traditional field of conflict studies, which is 
based on political sciences and economics, to psychology. This paper does not try to neglect 
the importance of any other proven factor, but as a matter of fact, it is just simply proposing 
a potential missing piece to the conflict puzzle.  
Initially, we should have a brief glance at the existing literature in order to demonstrate our 
contribution adequately. Most of the literature around armed conflicts is somehow 
associated with natural resources as most of the scholars look for the motivation of the 
rebels to solve the riddle of insurgency. In most of the works, Economic variables such as 
“GDP per capita” or “GDP Growth” get considerable attention. Some studies argue about 
the possible Sociological and Geographical links of a conflict onset e.g. Gurr (1971) along 
with many more after him, argues that grievance is one of the main factors of civil war. 
They claim that grievance is rooted in a behavioural paradigm, and emphasizes relative 
deprivation, social exclusion and inequality. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) discuss about 
ethnic dominancy
1
 as an influencing factor of civil war but also, they argue that looting 
                                                          
1 Where one ethnic group makes up to 45-90% of the population. 
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ability of natural resources has a stronger effect on rebellion. Moreover Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) introduce rough terrain
2
 as an effective factor on conflicts and argue that it prepares 
a proper place for insurgents to hide.  
At this point, one may ask if geographical/environmental features influence conflict in any 
other way rather than preparation of food or shelter. To be more clear, could weather affect 
our mood? The above questions have been discussed in a dozen of psychological studies 
centred on the relationship of temperature and individual’s aggression. For instance, 
Anderson (1989 and 2001), Baron and Bell (1976) argue that hot and uncomfortable 
temperatures bring more murder, rape, assault and other types of aggressive behaviour. 
Considering conflict as a collective aggressive act and based on crowd behaviour studies, 
we can learn that individuals’ behaviour could affect the whole group. Therefore, increase 
of violence and therefore conflict could be added to the negative consequences of global 
warming. Thus, it would be very beneficial in different aspects to conduct this research.  
In this paper, we select the set of control variables that Hegre and Sambanis (2006) verify to 
be statistically significant after a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of eighty-eight 
variables that have been frequently used by the literature to explain civil war. Then, we add 
the annual average temperature data to the model and test for its possible direct affect across 
regions controlling for the variables it could proxy. We find that consistent heat could be a 
factor in starting a conflict when controlling for every other potential factor such as soil 
quality, social infrastructure or diseases like malaria. Moreover, our results support the 
psychological studies on extreme temperatures and aggression. Accordingly, we could say 
mild weather decrease the probability of starting a conflict. 
Clearly we do not suggest that temperature is the only or even dominant reason for any of 
the past conflicts, but neither any other factor by itself. Homer-Dixon (1999) suggests 
“environmental scarcity is never [emphasis added] a sole or sufficient cause of large 
migrations, poverty, or violence; it always joins with other economic, political, and social 
factors to produce its effects”. Therefore, predicting a civil war is almost impossible as for 
one, conflict is an incident formed of many different causes and for other, solo acts of 
individuals have been triggered many wars before. Moreover, there is not a main theoretical 
model for conflict that most scholars agree on it and because of that we see different sets of 
variables in diverse papers.  
In the following, disregarding the appendix and references, there will be seven sections. 
Considering Introduction as Section 1, we are going to have literature review as the 2nd 
section right away. This part introduces the research area that our work belongs to and 
highlights some of the most celebrated results that previous scholars found. Afterwards, we 
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will explain briefly the methods Hegre and Sambanis used for their Sensitive analysis along 
with explanation of our employed method in details in section 3. Also there will be a 
discussion about the dispute around the number of independent variables one should 
consider in a model to get the most accurate results.  In the 4
th
 section you could expect to 
learn about the data that we have used and the sources we extracted them from. The main 
results will be discussed in section 5 alongside the interpretation of the results. We will 
explain why we believe temperature could have a direct effect on civil war using the 
estimations. We test the sensitivity of our analysis to change in method and data in chapter 
6. There will a brief conclusion to wrap up this paper in few paragraphs in section 7. 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this part we are going to go through the related literature that exists in Political Sciences, 
and Economics, Geography and Climate Studies and in the end, Psychological Sciences 
respectively. Most studies on conflict and war shape around the paradoxical term “Resource 
Curse”. Ross (2001) defines this term as the association of resource dependence/abundance 
with i) slower economic growth, ii) violent civil conflict, and iii) undemocratic regime 
types. Most cited theories for conflict are “Greed” and “Grievance” motives. The rational 
choice model considers civil war as a special form of non-cooperative behaviour, and the 
greed motive simply reflects opportunities for rebels (or rebel leaders) to enrich themselves, 
possibly by seizing resource rents. Grievance, in contrast, has a behavioural pattern, and 
emphasizes relative deprivation, social exclusion and inequality. In the case of resource rich 
countries, insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, 
insufficient job opportunities, and labour migration could be considered as grievance 
motives. 
There is a big dispute around the motive of the rebels, if they are only trying to loot or there 
are other incentives such as reforming religious, nationalist or economic grievance. Gurr 
(1971) argues the latter is the main factor of rebellion. However, recent studies are mostly 
reasoning against – or at least not in favour – grievance and supportive of greed based 
reasoning as the dominant factor in starting a civil war. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) 
compare the models based on grievance and greed factors and stated that grievance 
variables are mostly insignificant in starting a conflict. Although, they notice ethnic 
dominancy
3
 as an influencing factor of civil war but, they argue that looting ability of 
natural resources has stronger support for rebellion. In another study Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) argue that occurrence of civil war is not about cultural differences and ethnic 
grievances, but rather the conditions that favour insurgency. As a result, they consider the 
proportion of the country that is mountainous
4
 as an effective factor on conflict and argue 
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that it prepares a suitable place for insurgents to hide. Moreover, they state that grievance 
may favour rebellion by leading non-active rebels to help in hiding the active rebels. 
Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2009) conclude if the incidence of civil war is to be 
reduced; it will need to be made more difficult.  This is an implication of the feasibility 
hypothesis which proposes that where rebellion is possible, it will occur. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that resource wealth (specially oil) increases the probability 
of civil war by giving residents in resource-rich areas an incentive to form a separate state 
(Le Billon, 2001; Fearon, 2005) or by weakening the state’s bureaucratic capacity (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003). Ross (2004) conducts a research on thirteen civil wars to explore the 
mechanisms behind the relationship of resources with conflict. He argues while oil, nonfuel 
minerals, and illicit drugs appear to influence conflict, other types of primary commodities 
– notably legal agricultural commodities – seem to be unrelated to civil war in the cases he 
studies on.  
Despite several studies on natural resources, not many considered physical geography and 
global factors in conflict studies. However, researchers in development studies showed 
more interest in such factors e.g. Brunnshweiler and Bulte (2008) and Boschini et al. (2012) 
argue that Latitude proves to be the strongest instrument for institutions quality (they also 
check fractions of the population speaking English or another Western European language). 
The use of latitude as an instrument for institutions is initiated by Hall and Jones (1999) 
who argues the distance to the equator is related to “western influence” which in turn leads 
to good institutions. 
Briefly on the studies considering geographical factors; Latitude, as a factor, has been 
included in the past studies on wellbeing to capture other unobservable cross-country 
differences that may affect the overall standard of living, such as geography and climate. 
Countries farther from the equator (whether north or south) tend to have higher overall 
standards of living, while those near the equator have lower overall standards of living. 
There is not a very clear definition of these unobservable differences yet. There are some 
theories around it e.g. Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) stress the importance of levels of 
Gross National Product (GNP) per capita in the tropics, arguing that human health and 
agricultural productivity are adversely impacted by tropical climate. They use 1987 average 
temperature as an instrument variable to measure the effect of health on GNP per capita. 
They choose temperature because of its correlation with disease ecology and therefore the 
burden of disease. Similarly, Masters and McMillan (2001) stress the positive effects of 
winter frost on agricultural productivity. Acemoglu, Johnson and robinson (2000) argue that 
certain environments characterized by a heavy burden of infectious disease were exploited 
by predatory states (European settlers in the early 19
th
 century) rather than nurtured by the 
rule of law, and thereby failed to achieve sustained economic growth. 
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There are a few studies on the correlation of climate (or climate change) and armed 
conflicts. These works are mostly related to the literature that links environmental scarcity 
to conflict, emphasizing the role of renewable resources such as freshwater and arable land 
(Gleditsch et al., 2009; de Soysa, 2002; Urdal, 2005). CNA
5
 report in April 2007 concludes 
that climate change not only acts as a threat multiplier for instability in volatile regions but 
also, it would add tensions to the stable regions of the world (e.g. by decreasing food 
production and freshwater). While the conventional discourse linking climate change to 
conflict focuses on long term changes, Hendrix and Glaser (2007) suggest that inter-annual 
variability in rainfall is a more significant determinant of conflict than the measures of 
climate, land degradation, and freshwater resources. On the other hand, Ross (2004) 
suggests that “There is no statistical evidence – and very little case study evidence – that 
links agricultural commodities to either the initiation or the duration of civil war”6. 
The body of this work links the standard Political - Economics approach of studying on 
conflict to the Psychological Science. Of course there have been some behavioural findings 
among the past studies on conflict, especially in the grievance motives’ works, but none of 
them specify the psychological studies to support their results. There are various studies in 
psychology around the relationship of temperature and aggression. It has been argued that 
heat-induced discomfort makes people cranky and that produces aggressive outbursts in a 
variety of settings (Berkowitz, 1993). In other words, temperature could increase aggression 
through two means; by directly increasing feelings of hostility and indirectly increasing 
aggressive thoughts. 
Anderson (1989) argues hot temperatures produce increases in aggressive motives and 
tendencies (heat hypothesis). Hotter regions of the world yield more aggression; this is 
especially apparent when analyses are done within countries. Hotter years, quarters of years, 
seasons, months, and days all yield relatively more aggressive behaviours such as murders, 
rapes, assaults, riots, and wife beatings, among others.  
A mild insult is more likely to provoke a severe insult in response when people are hot than 
when they are more comfortable. This may lead to further increases in the aggressiveness of 
responses and counter-responses. Anderson (2001) states “An accidental bump in a hot and 
crowded bar can lead to the trading of insults, punches, and (eventually) bullets”. It has 
been argued in a few studies (Anderson and Anderson, 1998) that even a cold temperature 
could cause an increase in aggression (cold hypothesis) though, cold effects are less likely 
to occur in the natural environment because people can usually compensate fairly easily by 
                                                          
5 In 2006 “Centre for Naval Analyses” assembled a Military Advisory Board (MAB) of eleven retired admirals and generals to assess the 
impact of global climate change on key matters of national security.  
6 Ross (2004) also states “Gemstones, opium, coca, and cannabis do not seem to be linked to the initiation of conflict, but they do seem to 
lengthen pre-existing wars. Timber’s role remains untested”.  
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adding clothing. In general, being uncomfortable colours the way people see things. Minor 
insults may be perceived as major ones, inviting (even demanding) retaliation.  
Although alternative explanations occasionally account for the observed increases in 
aggression when temperatures are high, none are sufficient to account for most such heat 
effects (Anderson, 2001). Moreover, some researches tried to find the direct effect of heat 
on aggression using proxies. Kenrick and MacFarlane’s (1984) study find that aggressive 
horn honking increased at hotter temperatures, but only for drivers without air-conditioned 
cars. Also, Vrij, van der Steen, and Koppelaar (1994) conduct a field experiment in which 
Dutch police officers performed in a simulated burglary scenario under hot or comfortable 
conditions. Hot officers reported to be more aggressive and more likely to draw their 
weapon and shoot the suspect (with laser training weapons), relative to officers in the cool 
condition.  
Whereas, data consistently shows that violent – crime rates are higher in the South than in 
other regions of the United States and Europe (Anderson, 1989) but, some argued that other 
factors may be responsible for this effect.  Anderson et al. (2000) use statistical techniques 
to estimate the effect of temperature on violent-crime rate, while statistically controlling for 
the southernness, population size, and socioeconomic status of the cities. They find 
temperature statistically significant – besides having the biggest coefficient amongst the 
studied factors – and southerness insignificant to violent crime. They conclude that there is 
a higher violent level in hotter cities compared to the cooler ones even after city-to-city 
differences in southernness, population size, and socioeconomic status were statistically 
controlled.  
Field studies comparing aggression rates in hotter time periods versus cooler ones also 
support the heat hypothesis. For example, there are about 2.6% more murders and assaults 
in the United States during the summer than other seasons of the year; hot summers produce 
a bigger increase in violence than cooler summers; and violence rates are higher in hotter 
years than in cooler years even when various statistical controls are used (Anderson et al., 
2000). Moreover, there are some works studies on shorter time periods, where they find 
higher assaults, rapes, and domestic violence at hotter temperatures of the day (e.g. Cohn 
and Rotton, 1997; Anderson et al., 2005). 
Almost all the studies investigating this issue agree on the positive effect of heat on 
violence, but there is a disagreement about the linearity of this relationship, i.e. some 
believe aggression increases with heat to some point but then it decreases. For instance, 
Baron and Bell (1976) suggest that the level of negative affect experienced by subjects and 
the relative dominance of aggression could have a curvilinear relationship in nature. 
Furthermore, they argue that “up to some determinable point, aggression may become 
7 
 
increasingly dominant as negative affect rises (the fight response) but then, the tendency to 
engage in such behaviour may decrease as other responses incompatible with aggression 
(e.g., escaping from the extremely aversive situation, minimization of present discomfort) 
become increasingly dominant (the flight response)”. 
There have been various studies on armed conflict and civil war and different variables have 
been found to be responsible to start a conflict. But there is no theoretical agreement on 
what is the right set of variables to include in the model, and there is also mixed empirical 
support for many variables.  One of the most comprehensive papers in this field is 
“Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset” by Hegre and Sambanis (2006). 
These authors perform specification tests to check the robustness of eighty-eight variables 
(categorized into eighteen concepts) frequently used by the literature to explain civil war. 
They test the sensitivity of commonly cited and important results to small changes in the set 
of variables included in a regression. Then, they test how fragile the substantive inferences 
are to small changes. Their results show the importance of economic factors such as income 
and growth along with the political variables like institutional instability, incomplete 
democracy, and undemocratic neighbourhoods and even geographical factors like rough 
terrain. 
3.  METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Methodology that brought us here 
We carefully select our control variables from the solid sensitivity analysis that Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) conducted on eighty-eight most celebrated variables in the literature. 
Initially, we believe it is essential to briefly review the method they practice in their 
analysis. In their paper, they use the model Sala-i-Martin (1997) introduces in order to find 
the true set of variables for economic growth – as there were various set of variables 
introduced by different scholars. He estimates M models of the following form: 
𝛾𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑦𝑗𝑦 + 𝛽𝑧𝑗𝑧𝑗 + 𝛽𝑥𝑗𝑥𝑗 + 𝜀,  
where γ is the dependent variable and the subscript refers to the model (j ≤ M and j ∈ ℕ), y 
is a vector of core variables (three variables that appear in all the regressions), which are the 
natural log of population, the length of peacetime until the outbreak of a war, and the 
natural log of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant dollars. To continue, z is 
the variable of interest (i.e., the one whose behaviour is the centre of interest while changing 
the model specification), and xj ∈ χ is a vector of up to three variables taken from the pool χ 
of all available variables. To avoid multicollinearity – by including variables that measure a 
8 
 
similar concept in the model – they have categorized all the variables into eighteen concepts 
i.e. they grouped all the variables that could proxy for the similar concept together.  
Sala-i-Martin (1997) suggests to look at the entire distribution of the estimators of βz lying 
on each side of zero in order to assign some level of confidence to each of the variables. 
Following Sala-i-Martin’s method, Hegre and Sambanis consider separate cases for 
normality assumption of the distribution in their calculations. In the first case, where they 
consider the distribution of βz across model to be normal, they compute the cumulative 
distribution function [CDF(0)]
7
 after finding mean and the standard deviation of it from 
?̂?𝑧 = ∑ 𝜔𝑧𝑗𝛽𝑧𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1  where the weights, ωzj, are proportional to the (integrated) likelihoods 
𝜔𝑧𝑗 =
𝐿𝑧𝑗
∑ 𝐿𝑧𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1
 and ?̂?𝑧
2 = ∑ 𝜔𝑧𝑗𝜎𝑧𝑗
2𝑀
𝑗=1 . The reason for using this weighting scheme is to give 
more weight to the regressions or models that are more likely to be the true model. In the 
second case, they assume the distribution of the estimates of βz across models is not normal. 
They compute the aggregate CDF(0) of βz as the weighted average of all the individual 
CDF(0)'s: Ф𝑧(0) = ∑ 𝜔𝑗𝑧Ф𝑧𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1 (0 ?̂?𝑧𝑗⁄ 𝜎𝑧𝑗
^2) where Ф𝑧𝑗(0 ?̂?𝑧𝑗⁄ 𝜎𝑧𝑗
^2) stands for individual 
CDF(0) of each of the M regressions. The results provide some information on the best 
potential model for civil war onset by testing the fit of several theoretically relevant 
variables. 
3.2. Our Model 
Our study covers one hundred-twenty countries from 1970 to 2009 where ongoing conflicts 
considered as missing in our dependent variable data. We consider all the variables that are 
significant (by one-tailed test) in Hegre and Sambanis (2006) sensitivity analysis for any of 
the two dependent variables
8
 that they used for their estimations. Also, in order to avoid 
multicollinearity, we just choose one proxy from each concept variable. We end up with the 
following list of independent variables: Population, GDP per capita, peace years, ethno-
linguistic diversity, regulation of participation, regime durability, conflict in neighborhood 
dummy, GDP growth, oil exporter dummy, rough terrain, 90s (decade) dummy, Middle 
Eastern and North African countries dummy, partially free dummy, average of neighbors 
polity. We are not considering the “Military Personnel” variable because of too many 
missing observations. It practically starts from 1989 (except some observations for 1985) 
and there is a good chance that the reason for missing observations be correlated with the 
dependent variable 
9
(see more in 6.3).  
                                                          
7 Zero divides the area under the density in two. The larger of the two areas will be called CDF(0), regardless of whether this is the area 
above zero or below zero (Sala-i-Martin, 1997). 
8 They have used two different sources that measure armed conflicts for dependent variable. One from Sambanis (2004) civil war dataset 
and the other from Uppsala/PRIO internal armed conflicts (Gleditsch et al. 2002). 
9 Also, one could argue that military size changes with the risk of conflict (before it even happens and reached the benchmark number of 
deaths) and there could be a high level of endogeneity because of this. 
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Bearing in mind the various psychological studies on the relationship of temperature and 
aggression, we find it interesting to examine the potential effect that temperature could have 
on armed conflicts (since we can consider conflict as a group aggression activity). 
Although, some argue that grouped acts could not be supported statistically (e.g. in the 
literature that criticizes grievance motives) however, heat effect function differently 
compared to grievance motives. We use the average temperature data for each country. This 
means that this variable is time invariant and acts much like a country-specific effect. We 
want to look for the direct effect – if any – that temperature could have on the onset of a 
conflict by controlling for questionable factors that average temperature could proxy (e.g. 
social infrastructer, malaria, soil quality, precipitation, and tropical climate).  
There is not a consensus of opinion on a unified model to explain conflicts, however, we 
should get statistically correct results as long as the control variables are sensibly explained 
and justified and not selected merely because they have some impact on the dependent 
variable. Of course, our model cannot predict the reality completely – but neither does any 
other model – we believe it is sufficiently reliable. The only shortage of Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) methodology could be the limitation on testing joint significance (e.g. 
non-linear relationship) and that is something that we expect to have for temperature. 
Therefore, we check for temperature significance through various types of robustness 
checks after our logistic regressions. Our general model looks as the following: 
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑃𝑟 {𝑂𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖=1|𝑆, 𝑡, 𝑊}
1−𝑃𝑟 {𝑂𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖=1|𝑆, 𝑡, 𝑊}
) =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑠𝑗,𝑖
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑟(𝑡?̅?
 𝑟)
𝑂
𝑟=1
+ 𝐷1 ∑ 𝛾𝑞𝑤𝑞,𝑖
𝑃
𝑞=1
 
Where s ∈ S (set of controls), L=14 (except ModelA4 where L=13), 𝑡̅ stands for average 
temperature, w ∈ W (further controls) and O ≤ 2, P ≤ 5. Moreover, D1 = 0 if O = 1 and 
equal to one otherwise except the case for Russia where D1 could be equal to one even if O 
= 1. We cluster for errors in all the regressions we run. As, observations within a country 
could be correlated in some unknown way, which could induce correlation in observed 
errors within a country. 
Furthermore, there is a germane dispute around the number of variables one should use in 
the presence of theoretical ambiguity (as there is no true model for armed conflicts yet). 
One of the well-known theories that prefers parsimony in empirical exploration is Achen’s 
rule of Three (ART).  Achen (2002) proposes to use no more than three independent 
variables in regression analyses in the absence of a formal model as he believes that could 
unbalance the results. On the opposite side Oneal and Russett (2005) argue that applying 
this rule “severely limits our ability to evaluate theories in nested tests”, and therefore, “lead 
us to unconnected islands of theory with no indication of their relative importance”. 
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Moreover, it ignores some of the knowledge that could be used to get better predictions. 
They finish up with an example of a smoker who cannot be studied for hearth failure 
without considering the smokers’ age, sex, weight and so on. “If applied rigidly,” Oneal and 
Russett state “the rule of no more than three independent variables is as bad as rigorously 
following the poison ivy rule, which would have us avoid all the useful three-leaved plants 
just to escape those that leave an irritating rash”. We share this view with them alongside 
of many other scholars as there are numerous prestigious studies that considered many 
explanatory variables such as studies on economic growth or the literature on development 
and labour economics. 
4.  DATA 
UCDP
10
 defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or 
territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths”. We use the conflict data 
that UCDP/PRIO introduced as our dependent variable. By definition, there are four types 
of conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002): 
i. Extrasystemic armed conflict occurs between a state and a non-state group outside 
its own territory.  
ii. Interstate armed conflict occurs between two or more states.  
iii. Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and one or more 
internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states.  
iv. Internationalized internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state 
and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states 
(secondary parties) on one or both sides.  
For the purpose of this study, we primarily focus on “Internal armed conflicts”11. Moreover, 
UCDP/PRIO dataset allows us to separate minor conflicts (more than twenty-five deaths in 
a calendar year) from civil wars (more than one-thousand deaths in a calendar year). In the 
following, there is a brief introduction of the explanatory variables we use in this research, 
starting with the core variables that we include in all our regressions: 
i) Population (used in logarithm scale), from the World Bank, which counts all residents 
regardless of legal status or citizenship (except refugees not permanently settled in the 
country of asylum). ii) GDP Per Capita
12
 (used in logarithm scale), from the World Bank, 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. iii) Peace Years
13
 
                                                          
10 Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
11 We test the results adding “Internationalized internal armed conflicts” to our data in robustness checks but, not much changes really. 
12 GDP/Population 
13 Used as following: 2
−Years in peace
8⁄  
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from Hegre et al. (2009), number of consecutive years without conflict up to t - 2. The 
longer a country is at peace, the lower should be the risk of another war as “conflict-specific 
capital remains unused and peace-specific capital is accumulated” (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004). This brings out the term “Conflict Trap” used by Collier (2007) which describes 
when certain economic conditions dispose a country to civil war that could form a trap from 
violence cycle and make it difficult to escape. 
Now, we are going to introduce the covariates we use for the purpose of this paper with a 
brief description. Economic Growth
14
 is another suggested influencing factor extracted from 
the World Bank that we include in our regressions. It stands for annual percentage growth 
rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. We use Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity from Collier and Hoeffler (2004). They conduct this measure using the available 
data for 1960. In the economics literature this measure was first used by Mauro (1995) and 
it measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do 
not speak the same language. It stands in between zero to hundred. A value of zero suggests 
a complete homogenous society where the opposite end, one hundred, indicates a 
completely heterogeneous country. 
Moreover, there is Regulation of Participation extracted from Polity IV project. A five-
category scale is used to code when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed: 
i) Unregulated: there are no enduring national political organizations and no systematic 
regime controls on political activity. ii) Multiple Identity: There are relatively stable and 
enduring political groups which compete at the national level–parties, regional groups, or 
ethnic groups. iii) Sectarian: Political demands are characterized by incompatible interests 
and swing between intense factionalism and government favouritism. iv) Restricted: Some 
organized political participation is permitted but significant groups are regularly excluded 
from the political process. v) Regulated: Relatively stable and enduring political groups 
regularly compete for political influence and positions with little use of coercion (see more 
in Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). Another variable from Polity IV project that we are 
including in our main set of our regressions is the Regime Durability
15
. It is defined as the 
number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the 
Polity Score
16
 over a period of three years or less). 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that proportion of the country which is mountainous is a 
significant factor in starting a civil war as it prepares an insurgent favour environment. They 
also introduced Oil Exporter dummy which is basically equal to one when, in a country-
year, fuel exports exceed one third of export revenues.  
                                                          
14 (GDPt – GDPt-1) / GDPt-1 
15 Used as the following: 2 
−Durable
0.5⁄  
16 The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 
(consolidated democracy).  
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In order to take into account the neighborhood political economy, we use the neighbor’s 
average polity score
17
 from Hegre et al. (2009). Civil War in Neighborhood dummy 
suggested being significant in Hegre and Sambanis analysis as well despite the arguments 
against spillover effect in some major studies (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
The next variable we use is a dummy indicating part free countries. A Partly Free country is 
one in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil liberties. Usually, partially 
free states “suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious 
strife, and a political landscape in which a single party enjoys dominance despite a certain 
degree of pluralism” (Freedom House). We have also a dummy variable indicating Middle 
Eastern and North African countries
18
 in our main set as it has been suggested to be of 
important in multiple previous studies. For time periods, we use nineties decade dummy as 
well. 
We take the weather data from the World Bank. Our focus variable demonstrates the 
average temperature from 1961 to 1999 by country. We change the temperature scales from 
Celsius to Fahrenheit to get rid of negative values
19
.  Furthermore, there are some control 
variables that we use in some of the regressions to look for temperature’s direct effect. We 
select these variables based on the results from some past development studies. We include 
latitude coordinates of the country’s capital20 from La Porta (1999)21 in some of the models 
as it may capture the life quality in countries.  
Moreover, we have the data for the share of 1995 population living in the area with risk of 
Malaria from Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999). We extracted soil quality data from the 
same sources as well. Another climate factor that we use to control for temperatures’ direct 
effect is the level of Precipitation that has been extracted from the World Bank. It measures 
the mean annual precipitation by country for the period 1961 to 1999. In the end, we use the 
percentage of 1995 population living in tropics and subtropics
22
 from Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (2000). You could find more details for all the discussed variables in Appendix 2. 
Variable Concept Brief description Source 
Population Core variable Population in Logarithm scale World Bank 
GDP per Capita Core variable Gross domestic product divided by World Bank 
                                                          
17 Average of the neighbour’s polity3 minus the country's own; where a Democracy identifies with the digit 2, an Anocracy with 1, and in 
the end an Autocracy recognizes with 0. 
18
 This dummy has been taken from Hegre and Sambanis (2006) but corrected for Bhutan as they took it as a MENA country by mistake. 
19 Fahrenheit =  ((9 5⁄ ) × Celsius) +32  
20 (Absolut value of Capital′s Latitude) 90⁄  
21 We have also used the average latitude of the country – and not the capital’s latitude – but no matter which to use, the results would not 
change. 
22 Defined by Koeppen-Geiger geographical system. 
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mid-year population in Logarithm scale 
Peace Years Core variable Number of consecutive years without 
conflict up to t – 2. 
Hegre et al. (2009) 
Economic Growth Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
at market prices based on constant 
local currency 
World Bank 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Diversity 
Ethnic 
Fragmentation 
Probability that two randomly drawn 
individuals from a given country do not 
speak the same language 
Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) 
Regulation of 
Participation 
Level of democracy When, whether and how political 
preferences expressed 
Polity IV project 
Regime Durability Political durability Number of peace years since the most 
recent regime change 
Polity IV project 
Rough Terrain Terrain, geography, 
and population 
distribution 
Proportion of the country that is 
mountainous 
Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) 
Oil Exporter Resources Dummy for a country-year with fuel 
exports more than third of export 
revenues 
Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) 
Neighbor’s Average 
Polity Score 
Neighborhood 
political economy 
Average of the neighbour’s polity3 
minus the country's own 
Hegre et al. (2009) 
Conflict in 
Neighborhood 
Neighborhood war Dummy for a conflict in neighborhood Hegre et al. (2009) 
Partially Free Inconsistency of 
political institutions 
Dummy for a country with limited 
respect for political rights and civil 
liberties 
Freedom House 
MENA Region Dummy for Middle Eastern and North 
African countries 
Authors’ coding 
Nineties Time Dummy for 90’s decade Authors’ coding 
Average 
Temperature 
- Average temperature from 1961 to 
1999 by country 
World Bank 
Precipitation - Precipitation from 1961 to 1999 by 
country 
World Bank 
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Latitude - (Absolut value of Capitals’ latitude)/90 La Porta (1999) 
Malaria - Share of 1995 population living in the 
area with risk of Malaria 
Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999) 
Soil Quality -  Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (1999) 
Tropical Area - Share of 1995 population living in 
tropics or subtropics 
Gallup, Sachs, and 
Mellinger (2000) 
 
5.  ESTIMATIONS AND RESULTS 
5.1.  The evidence   
In this section we explain our main results from estimating different versions of the logit 
model we use for explaining the onset of conflict based on the dataset discussed above. In 
Table 1, we report the estimates corresponding to the models which use our main 
explanatory variables, with the dependent variable being the onset of intra-state conflicts 
involving with more than twenty-five fatalities. Column A1 corresponds to the logistic 
regression (clustered for countries) that includes only those regressors that were used by 
Hegre and Sambanis (2006).  The rest of the columns show the role of additional 
explanatory variables when they are added to the specification suggested by the authors. 
A quick glance at the results reported in Table 1 indicates that some of the explanatory 
variables which are considered to be crucial in influencing the onset of a conflict turn out to 
have statistically insignificant impact.  While this could be due to the different dataset used 
in this study, given that our dataset extends the sample period these results could be 
interpreted as suggesting a further refinement of the role of the variables involved with 
those that still have significant impact being considered as “more relevant” in the context. 
In particular, out of the fourteen original variables (from different concept groups), the 
following five have retained their statistically significant impact in our regressions:  
logarithm of lagged population; logarithm of the number of peace years since the last 
conflict; ethno-linguistic diversity; regime durability; existence of a conflict in the 
neighbouring regions; and GDP growth.  
There seems to be a general consensus in the literature on the positive impact of population 
size on the onset of conflict. This, however, could be simply due to the definition of the 
dependent variable which is usually a discrete dummy constructed on the basis of a 
predetermined threshold (e.g. onset = 1  if  fatalities > n). Thus, the positive causation could 
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be reflecting the fact that the larger is the population of a region the higher is the likelihood 
that a conflict in that region would result in a larger number of fatalities.  
The next explanatory variable which is commonly reported in the literature as a significant 
determinant of conflict onset is a measure of “the length of peace period since the last 
conflict”. The impact of this variable is interpreted within the historical context in that past 
conflicts in a region are believed to alter its social characteristics. As explained in Collier 
(2007), “Conflict Trap” is a common phenomenon in the regions that have been struggling 
with “Poverty Trap”. He argues that a conflict trap “shows how certain economic conditions 
make a country prone to civil war, and how, once conflict has started, the cycle of violence 
becomes a trap from which is difficult to escape”. We therefore expect the coefficient of this 
variable to be negative and significant. Moreover, our results are similar to the studies that 
suggest the existence of a possible link connecting the individual’s behaviours (i.e. 
grievance motives) to triggering an armed conflicts by finding a statistically significant 
coefficient for ethnic fragmentation (see arguments in favour in Gurr, 1971 and against in 
Collier and Hoefller, 2004).  
A political factor that remained significant throughout our analysis and measures the 
stability of government is the Regime durability. A change in regime (either democratic or 
autocratic) unbalances the power structure of the country and results in temporary weakness 
inside the system. While we study the effect of economic, political and geographical factors 
of the country on the onset of conflict, we should not forget the role that neighbouring 
countries could have on this issue. We have found evidence for neighbourhood effect on 
civil war that is consistent with Sambanis (2001), while some other major studies (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003) have argued against the relevance of spill-over effects. 
We found a positive coefficient for GDP growth in all our models
23
, which is in contrast 
with some of the past studies (e.g.  Collier and Hoefller, 2004) where, growth had been 
considered as the “Opportunity Cost” measurement. There could be two explanations for 
this (Hendrix and Glaser, 2007);  
i. Aggregate measures such as GDP tend to be unreliable in highly stratified, primarily 
rural developing countries (Heston, 1994).  
ii. GDP growth does not accurately capture the opportunity cost to participate in 
rebellion. 
Also, considering that GDP growth derived from dividing the change in GDP over the size 
of the economy, and keeping in mind that developing countries with smaller economies 
                                                          
23 GDP growth is not significant in most of the models however,  its p value is always in between 0.05 and 0.1 
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usually experience conflicts more often, one could identify the positive association that 
growth could have with the onset of conflict. 
 
Although, adding temperature to the set of variables (Model A2) does not particularly adds 
more information to the estimates, however, step-wise regression (using t-test) suggests 
keeping it. Now, if we graph the probability of the conflict onset against the average of 
temperature, we find a non-linear and convex shaped relationship (Figure 1). Adding the 
second power of average temperature into Model A2 results in the temperature becoming 
significant. As a result, we claim that temperature is not significant in the first power 
however, adding the second power strengthens temperature’s ability to predict the 
TABLE A: Main Estimations
ModelA1:
Set of 
Controls
ModelA2: 
Adding 
Temperature
ModelA3: Adding 
Tempreture^2 
(Baseline Model)
ModelA4: 
Dropping 
Income
ModelA5: 
Adding 
Latitude
ModelA6: 
Adding Soil 
Quality
ModelA7: 
Adding 
Precipitation
ModelA8: 
Adding 
Tropical Area
ModelA9: 
Adding 
Malaria Risk
ModelA10: 
Adding all
Population 0.335
***
0.355
***
0.385
***
0.382
***
0.398
***
0.381
***
0.388
***
0.382
***
0.413
***
0.426
***
GDP Per Capita 0.0409 0.104 0.153 0.144 0.154 0.16 0.153 0.224 0.217
Peace Years -0.755
***
-0.744
***
-0.732
***
-0.716
***
-0.740
***
-0.730
***
-0.730
***
-0.731
***
-0.730
***
-0.733
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.0121
*
0.0114
**
0.0109
*
0.00923
*
0.0106
*
0.0111
*
0.0109
*
0.0110
** 0.00848 0.00804
Regime Durability 0.640
*
0.672
*
0.722
*
0.669
*
0.753
*
0.721
*
0.717
*
0.720
*
0.717
*
0.759
*
Conflict in 
Neighborhood
0.728
**
0.701
**
0.651
*
0.637
*
0.634
*
0.645
*
0.643
*
0.642
*
0.616
*
0.601
*
Rough Terrain 0.0074 0.0113 0.0212
**
0.0189
**
0.0185
*
0.0210
**
0.0214
**
0.0210
**
0.0203
*
0.0158
*
Neighbors Average 
Polity
-0.358 -0.35 -0.393
* -0.369 -0.407
* -0.388 -0.381 -0.388 -0.379 -0.394
*
Average 
Temperature
0.0179 -0.161
**
-0.151
*
-0.175
**
-0.160
*
-0.158
**
-0.159
**
-0.155
*
-0.180
*
Average 
Temperature^2
0.00161
**
0.00149
**
0.00160
**
0.00160
**
0.00160
**
0.00159
**
0.00150
**
0.00153
*
Latitude Yes Yes
Soil Quality Yes Yes
Mean Annual 
Precipitation
Yes Yes
%Tropics and 
Subtropics
Yes Yes
%Pop. in Malaria 
Area
Yes Yes
Constant -8.883
***
-11.08
***
-8.005
***
-6.769
***
-6.731
**
-7.973
***
-8.032
***
-7.987
***
-8.931
***
-7.103
*
Pseudo R^2 0.2873 0.287 0.2938 0.2908 0.2947 0.2905 0.2939 0.2905 0.2942 0.2944
Log Likelihood -429.98 -428.11 -424.04 -430.94 -423.46 -423.77 -423.97 -423.78 -422.61 -421.49
N 3421 3355 3355 3378 3355 3286 3355 3286 3318 3286
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
Controlling for variables that temperature could proxy
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dependent variable (Model A3). These results suggest that extreme weathers increase the 
chance of a conflict. In the psychological papers mentioned in the litereature review section, 
psychologists argue that a rise in aggressiveness could caused by an increase in the level of 
discomfort due to an unpleasent temperature (Berkowitz, 1993; Anderson, 2001). 
Figure 1: Probability of conflict onset by average temperature 
 
We drop GDP per capita in Model A4 in order to investigate the potential effect that having 
both GDP per capita and average temperature could have on the results. We do not find any 
reason to keep any of these two variables out of the estimations. 
We want to answer the genuine concern about the possible correlation of temperature with 
some geographical factors that could lead to a false estimation for temperature’s effect on 
the dependent variable where, it is actually acting as a proxy for another factor. Thus, we 
control for the most possible factors by adding them to our baseline model separately and 
also combined (Model A6 - A10). We borrow most of the variables for this part from 
development literature. For instance, Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (1999) argue that the 
mechanisms linking tropical climates to lower agricultural productivity is the unsuitability 
of tropical soil, Eurasian agriculture and increased disease burden. Accordingly, we are 
controlling for the potential effect that either soil quality, precipitation, malaria and the 
portion of country under tropical area could have on conflict that temperature may proxy 
them. We also control for latitude as it has a decent correlation with temperature and also it 
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has suggested to have a strong association with institution quality for unclear reasons. Yet 
again, adding the latitude (for both capital city and country’s average) of countries, does not 
affect the significance that average temperature holds in our model.  
Once again, we go around the shape of the relationship that conflict probability have with 
temperature. The convexity of the curve suggests that not only hot weather could influence 
aggression positively but also, cold weather as well – by decreasing the level of comfort. 
Anderson et al. (2000) argues “if one eliminates this real world asymmetry in ability to 
compensate for excessive cold vs heat, as one can do in lab settings, then similar hot and 
cold effects on aggressive behaviour may well occur”.  
5.2.  Russia’s Case  
Our results on cold temperature are consistent with what psychological studies suggest, 
however, it turns out all the conflicts in the cold area of the world correspond to Russia. 
Moreover, given the large size of Russia
24
, the average temperature allocated to it might be 
imprecise. Therefore, we tested our estimation by dropping Russia in Table B.   
Dropping Russia disables the non-linear effect that temperature held over the probability of 
conflict onset by turning the second power insignificant. By graphing this relationship, we 
see a linear association this time (Figure 2).  Thus, we have dropped the second power in 
Model B2 – as there was no use in it anymore – which results in a significant coefficient for 
temperature. This suggests a linear and positive relationship between temperature and the 
probability of starting a new armed conflict. Just like the first table, we test the estimations 
by controlling for potential geographical factors. This, again, does not change our results 
remarkably. We have graphed the relationship of temperature with conflict onset separately 
for northern and southern countries
25
, just out of curiosity, and found out that the conflict 
probability responds differently to increase in temperature when the heat goes further than 
72.6
o
 Fahrenheit (see Figure 2).  
In the graph spotting the northern countries, the probability of conflict increases by the 
temperature till 72.6
o
 Fahrenheit but then it starts to decrease where, this probability 
increases for southern countries consistently. 
 
                                                          
24 The area of Russia (17m km2) is almost double the second biggest country, Canada (10m km2), and even bigger that the whole Europe 
(10m km2) the continent. 
25 By the sign of latitude, negative (positive) values stand for southern countries (north). 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE B: Russia's Case 
ModelB1: 
Dropping 
Russia
ModelB2: 
Dropping Russia 
and Temperature^2
ModelB3: 
Adding 
Latitude
ModelB4: 
Adding Soil 
Quality
ModelB5: 
Adding 
Precipitation
ModelB6: 
Adding 
Tropical Area
ModelB7: 
Adding 
Malaria Risk
ModelB8: 
Adding all
Population 0.388
***
0.386
***
0.400
***
0.384
***
0.388
***
0.383
***
0.418
***
0.413
***
Peace Years -0.706
***
-0.704
***
-0.712
***
-0.703
***
-0.702
***
-0.700
***
-0.699
***
-0.696
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.0108
*
0.0106
*
0.0103
*
0.0108
*
0.0106
*
0.0108
* 0.00809 0.00807
Regime Durability 0.784
*
0.779
*
0.809
*
0.776
*
0.772
*
0.772
*
0.778
*
0.781
*
Conflict in 
Neighborhood
0.646
*
0.647
*
0.630
*
0.629
*
0.637
*
0.629
*
0.600
*
0.608
*
GDP growth 0.0303 0.0302 0.03 0.0301 0.0306 0.0304 0.0289
* 0.0286
Rough Terrain 0.0211
**
0.0200
**
0.0172
*
0.0200
**
0.0203
**
0.0200
**
0.0197
**
0.0192
**
Neighbors 
Average Polity
-0.39 -0.388 -0.400
* -0.382 -0.374 -0.379 -0.375 -0.388
Average 
Temperature
0.000517 0.0578
***
0.0419
*
0.0575
**
0.0596
***
0.0588
***
0.0511
**
0.0503
**
Average 
Temperature^2
0.000446
Latitude -1.514
Soil Quality -0.0015 0.00411
Mean Annual 
Precipitation
-0.0000682 0.0000866
%Tropics and 
Subtropics
-0.0819 -0.105
%Pop. in Malaria 
Area
0.755 0.822
Constant -13.51
***
-15.16
***
-13.87
***
-15.07
***
-15.18
***
-15.12
***
-15.98
***
-16.11
***
Pseudo R^2 0.2911 0.2909 0.2918 0.2879 0.2911 0.2879 0.2921 0.2907
Log Likelihood -416.62 -416.71 -416.19 -416.38 -416.61 -416.35 -414.87 -414.7
N 3348 3348 3348 3279 3348 3279 3311 3279
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
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Figure 2: Probability of conflict onset by average temperature after dropping Russia 
 
One of the possible explanations for this provided by Baron (1976) and it is called the 
“Flight theory”. Briefly, this theory suggests that one’s aggression level increases in 
temperature to some point (argued to be 74.9
o
 Fahrenheit, see Figure 3 and 4) but then, this 
aggression decreases in temperature if the person is under a big amount of pressure. It 
would be of interest to check for some of the economic and political characteristics of the 
countries that sit into this category (temperature more than 72.6
o
 Fahrenheit) to see if we 
could find a similar situation here. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4: Assault rate by temperature                
Rohn and Cotton (1997)                                                                                                   Rohn and Cotton (2005) 
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Considering this, one may argue that northern part of the world with average temperature of 
more than 72.6
o
 Fahrenheit may be experiencing a worse life condition than the southern 
part (based on the flight theory). In order to measure the quality of life, we have used an 
index constructed by UNDP known as “Human development index”26. It is a composite 
index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development – a 
long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. The average HDI for the 
northern countries – that have a temperature more than 72.6o Fahrenheit – is .54, which gets 
recognized by a “low human development” in the UNDP labelling system. On the other 
hand, southern countries would be categorized in the “medium human development” group 
based on UNDP categorization with a HDI level of .59. There are some other measure that 
we checked here as well; such as the “Freedom House Index”27 that measures the level of 
freedom in countries where “Free”=1.5, “Part Free”=1 and “Not Free”=0.5. Both the 
values for HDI and FH Indices are statistically different comparing south to north. 
However, in terms of “Propensity Index”28 comparison, both northern and southern 
countries ranked the same in average. 
Figure 5: Comparing some of the northern and southern countries’ aspects 
 
                                                          
26 See Technical note 1 (http://hdr.undp.org/en) for details on how the HDI is calculated. 
27  It assesses each country's degree of political freedoms and civil liberties. See more at (https://freedomhouse.org/) 
28
 The Legatum Prosperity Index is an annual ranking, developed by the Legatum Institute, of 142 countries. The ranking is based on a 
variety of factors including wealth, economic growth and quality of life. 
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Moreover, the southern and northern part of this sample has statistically different population 
and GDP per capita where, south holds a better rank in terms of GDP per capita and the 
volume of peace years. There will be more comparisons for other factors in Appendix 1. 
So far, we learned whether we keep Russia in our sample or not, there exists a positive 
relationship between the average temperature and the probability of a conflict onset. Where, 
based on the psychological works, this effect is coming from comfort level of individuals. 
People tend to increase their comfort level by avoiding/terminating the causes of discomfort 
where possible. This way of describing human behaviours is similar to the definition of 
grievance motives in some ways (e.g. in both cases people are unhappy) but different in 
other aspects (unconscious effect for heat). Here, I would like to humbly suggest a new 
classification for conflict motives: 
i. Greed and looting 
ii. Convenience (Suitable conditions) 
iii. General satisfaction (Level of Comfort) 
The significance of this perception in looking at a conflict is simply the fact that it could 
cover more effective factors compared to the classical classification (i.e. Greed and 
Grievance). For instance, psychological variables – and other factors influence the 
behaviour unintentionally – do not have any place in that existing categorization. In this 
classification, we categorize the reasons of conflicts and not the factors; i.e. each category 
contains of many different factors that influence the onset of a conflict. Also, normally, 
different factors should be present in a country – all together – so a conflict happens. In 
other words, a conflict is a product of many different raw materials, where each of these 
materials could classify into one of the groups that we just presented above.  
The first group is supported in most of the economic papers written on this topic such as 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), where they have suggested the greed based motives contain the 
most statistically significant factors. There is ambiguity about the significance of grievance 
motives but, we stand with the scholars in favour of this type of motives. Also, to improve 
this group of motives, we put psychological factors together with grievance motives and 
label them as “General Satisfaction”. The last category points out the basic tools required 
for insurgency. These factors are vital in starting a conflict as the presence of other factors 
may not lead to a conflict alone if the rebels do not find arming convenient. Fearon and 
Laitin (2003) argued that suitable conditions (poverty, suitable hiding zones, etc.) have an 
essential role in starting a conflict.    
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5.3)    Minor Vs Major conflicts 
Another interesting result appears when we distinguish between conflicts in respect to their 
fatality threshold.  Basically, we label a conflict as minor when the number of fatalities is in 
between 25 to 1000 heads and major when there are more than 1000 battle related fatalities. 
Clearly, there are more minor conflicts rather than the major ones (for onset and also 
incidence
29
, see Figure 6 and 7). In our dataset, there are 135 minor conflict onsets and only 
23 major ones (variable list and brief description could be found in Appendix 2).  
Figure 6: Number of conflict onsets by year                      Figure 7: Number of conflict incidences by year 
 
From the results indicated in Table C, we could conclude that temperature’s significance – 
and magnitude – increases when considering just minor conflicts but, temperature’s role 
becomes irrelevant when studying just the major ones.  We could interpret this difference 
by pointing out the ease of occurrence for a minor conflict compared to a major one. Minor 
conflicts probably need less advanced planning and could happen more sudden and even 
merely based on emotions. On the other hand, a major conflict needs more planning, 
stronger army and of course a bigger budget. 
We can see the growth has a positive and significant effect on major conflicts, where this 
relationship is insignificant for the minor ones. This, again, could fit into the argument 
criteria on the sign of growth variable that we have discussed earlier in this paper.  
                                                          
29 Incidence: there exists at least one active conflict in the corresponding country-year. 
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6.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section, we investigate the precision of our results by testing their sensitivity to both 
data (Table D and E) and method (Table F). With respect to data, we investigate the effect 
of outlying observations, and of different definitions of the dependent and independent 
variables. With respect to method, we investigate the outcome of including year dummies, 
random effects and rare events bias.  
 
 
TABLE C: Conflict Types 
ModelC1: 
Minor Conflicts
 ModelC2: Major 
Conflicts
Population 0.298
***
0.645
***
Peace Years -0.652
***
-1.287
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.00994
* 0.00877
Regime Durability 0.818
* 0.112
GDP growth 0.024 0.0324
*
Rough Terrain 0.0197
** 0.0302
Neighbors Average 
Polity
-0.343
* -0.697
Average 
Temperature
-0.150
** -0.173
Average 
Temperature^2
0.00153
** 0.00161
Constant -6.859
***
-11.45
**
Pseudo R^2 0.2396 0.3863
Log Likelihood -408.41 -64.01
N 3355 1364
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
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6.1. With Respect to Data 
6.1.1. Different definition for dependent and independent variables 
We start by investigating a simple issue that may bring questions to the way we constructed 
our temperature variable. As, the temperature’s data is averaged by country, one may argue 
this could privilege this factor when studying its effect on the dependent variable. However, 
if we use the same method to construct a new variable for GDP per capita (averaging for 
country throughout the time period), we will still deal with a non-significant GDP per 
capita. For the next model, we attempt dropping the countries with population less than a 
million following Fearon and Laitin (2003) method. Except a slightly improved likelihood 
(obviously), we do not detect any other noticeable change.  
We have substituted the average temperature with variables capable of capturing the effect 
we are looking for in Model D3 and D4.  In these models we use average maximum 
temperature and a category variable – to group all temperature values into either cold, mild 
or hot
30
 – respectively to see if the heat effect still exists when we replace the focus variable 
with something of similar concept. We see that maximum temperature responds to conflict 
onset in the same manner as our focus variable. Also, hot countries have 72% more chance 
of conflict (onset) comparing to the mild ones.  
To continue, some of the studies in development literature argue that latitude could linearly 
proxy welfare and/or institutions quality. Testing this assumption in our model, we found 
latitude to be insignificant in the first power; however, it could have a cubic relationship 
with the probability of conflict. Considering figure 8 and Model D5, one could argue that 
latitude could proxy temperature in its cubic form. By allowing the ongoing conflicts to take 
the value of zero – in ModelD6 – instead of marking them as missing data, nineties decade 
gets significant apart from the decrease in our model’s precision (lower R2 and bigger 
absolute value of likelihood) and increase in the number of observations. Moreover, we 
have considered including internationalized conflicts in the dependent variable (twenty-two 
extra onsets) for Model D7. This supplement, again, does not change our results except 
worsening the log likelihood, which was expected as internationalized conflicts could 
sometimes be contradictory to the normal conflicts; i.e., an international conflict could 
contain a country in one side that is situated far away from the place that war is actually 
taking place (incidence location).  
And finally, Model D8 conducts a logistic regression on the set of explanatory variables that 
found to be significant when Hegre and Sambanis (2006) used UCDP conflict data as the 
dependent variable’s source. 
                                                          
30 A country classifies into Cold if its average temperature < Mean (average temperature) – std dev., Hot if average temperature> [Mean 
(average temperature) + std dev] and Mild if [Mean (average temperature) – std dev.] <average temperature< [Mean (average 
temperature) + std dev.] 
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TABLE D: Robustness Checks with Respect to Data 
ModelD1: 
Average 
Income
ModelD2: Dropping 
Counries with 
Population<500000
ModelD3: 
Maximum 
Temperature
ModelD4: 
Hot, Mild 
and Cold
ModelD5: 
Cubic 
Latitude
ModelD6: 
Considering Ongoing 
Conflicts as "0"s
ModelD7: Including 
Internationalized 
Conflicts
ModelD8: 
Just UCDP 
Factors
Population 0.383
***
0.382
***
0.396
***
0.391
***
0.423
***
0.423
***
0.359
***
0.374
***
Average GDP per 
Capita
0.0659
Peace Years -0.718
***
-0.733
***
-0.734
***
-0.732
***
-0.745
***
-0.745
***
-0.689
***
-0.720
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.0100
*
0.0107
*
0.0105
*
0.00982
*
0.0107
**
0.0107
**
0.0104
*
0.0115
**
Regime Durability 0.678
*
0.720
*
0.673
*
0.686
*
0.759
*
0.759
*
0.634
*
0.642
*
Conflict in 
Neighborhood
0.644
*
0.654
*
0.641
*
0.687
*
0.658
*
0.658
*
0.601
*
0.746
**
Rough Terrain 0.0199
**
0.0211
**
0.0187
* 0.00928 0.0123
*
0.0123
*
0.0206
**
0.0190
*
Nineties 0.241 0.213 0.206 0.244 0.219 0.523
* 0.247 0.167
Neighbors Average 
Polity
-0.37 -0.397
* -0.34 -0.36 -0.401
*
-0.527
***
-0.438
*
Average 
Temperature
-0.153
**
-0.161
**
-0.110
*
-0.158
**
-0.111
*
Average 
Temperature^2
0.00153
**
0.00161
**
0.00111
*
0.00157
**
0.00116
*
Average Maximum 
Temperature
-0.0747
*
Average Maximum 
Temperature^2
0.00428
**
Cold -0.814
Hot 0.721
*
Latitude 7.776
Latitude^2 -49.34
*
Latitude^3 57.43
**
Constant -7.376
***
-7.902
***
-8.108
***
-10.98
***
-11.03
***
-6.658
***
-7.333
***
-8.356
***
Pseudo R^2 0.291 0.2934 0.2943 0.2904 0.2973 0.1624 0.2739 0.2768
Log Likelihood -430.8 -423.75 -425.74 -426.04 -423.94 -544.29 -454.05 -448.405
N 3378 3338 3421 3355 3421 3930 3363 3519
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
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Figure 8: Average temperature by latitude (in absolute value) 
 
6.1.2. A different main set 
We are going to answer to the following question in this section: What happens if we 
choose a different set of main variables that proposed to be significant in Hegre and 
Sambanis (2006) analysis? Obviously, we follow the same rules in selecting the variables 
by not including two variables defining the same concept to avoid any possible 
multicollinearity. Just like before, we include the three core variables in all the models. But, 
apart from that, we have substituted the variables in our previous main set with other 
significant variables defining the same concept group (if available)
31
, to detect any possible 
change in our focus variable’s significance level. We have used the same variable as before 
when there was no substitutes available. Also, we add variables that hold a significant p-
value in Hegre and Sambanis (2006) analysis when they use a normal distribution 
assumption but not significant when tested assuming a non-normal distribution (e.g. 
Number of languages in Ethnologue, Ethnic dominance, Polity score, Presidential 
government, Western Europe and the US dummy, Primary commodity export/GDP). 
The new variables we used in the models shown in Table E are: Ethnic Fractionalization 
Index, Share of Largest Group & Anocracy dummy (Fearon and Laitin, 2003); Linguistic 
Component of ehet & Religious Component of ehet (Vanhanen, 1999); Polity Score 
                                                          
31 Some concepts do not have more than one variable that be significant. 
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(Marshal and Jaggers, 2002); Ethnic Dominance Measure (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004); Oil 
Production & Oil Export/GDP (World Bank); Presidential Democracy (cheibub et al., 
2010); Political Instability & Western Europe and the US dummy (Authors’ coding); Total 
Number of Neighbours at war (Sambanis, 2004). Due to termination of preparing “Primary 
Commodity Exports/GDP” data by the World Bank, we have used “Oil Production” and 
“Oil Export/GDP” data instead as suggested by Fearon and Laitin (2005). 
 
 
TABLE E: Selecting a Different Main Set
ModelE1: 
Different Set of 
Control 
Variables
ModelE2: 
Adding 
Temperature 
(Baseline)
ModelE3: 
Different Variable 
measuring Ethnic 
Fragmentation
ModelE4: Different 
Variables 
measuring Ethnic 
Fragmentation
ModelE5: Oil 
Export/GDP 
Inseat of Oil 
Production 
ModelE6: 
Adding 
Controls for 
Temperature
ModelE7: 
Adding 
Military 
Personnel
ModeE8: 
Adding 
Autonomy
ModelE9:  
Total 
Neighbours at 
War
Population 0.374
***
0.428
***
0.389
***
0.346
***
0.445
***
0.450
***
0.379
***
0.390
***
0.397
***
Peace Years -0.735
***
-0.708
***
-0.694
***
-0.712
***
-0.826
***
-0.699
***
-0.848
***
-0.616
***
-0.619
***
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Index
1.174
* 0.857 0.85 0.389 0.686 0.774 0.708
Conflict in Neighborhood 0.612
*
0.569
*
0.564
*
0.555
* 0.577 0.569 0.672 0.469
Rough Terrain 0.00566 0.0187
**
0.0185
**
0.0215
**
0.0244
** 0.0132 0.0268
**
MENA 0.502 0.790
* 0.756 0.822
* 0.858 1.275
** 0.682 1.134
***
1.159
***
Average Temperature -0.151
*
-0.142
*
-0.157
*
-0.187
**
-0.174
*
-0.175
*
-0.154
*
-0.158
*
Average Temperature^2 0.00153
*
0.00145
*
0.00163
**
0.00181
**
0.00148
*
0.00179
*
0.00160
**
0.00164
**
Ethnic Heterogeneity 
Index
0.00799
**
%Largest Ethnic Group 0.063
Religions 0.00000981
Languages 0.0309
*
Oil export/GDP 4004324.6
Military Personnel 0.000329
Autonomy 0.718
*
Total Neighbours at War 0.0595
Latitude Yes
%Pop. in Malaria Area Yes
Mean Annual Yes
Soil Quality Yes
%Tropics and Subtropics Yes
Constant -8.116
***
-7.098
***
-6.605
***
-6.032
***
-5.760
**
-5.770
*
-6.431
**
-5.992
**
-5.716
*
Pseudo R^2 0.2749 0.28 0.2827 0.2819 0.3533 0.2822 0.3569 0.2509 0.2389
Log Likelihood -451.41 -446.12 -444.48 -444.93 -288.6 -442.5 -260.45 -356.24 -354.68
N 3577 3509 3509 3509 2331 3437 1985 2632 2626
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
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6.1.3. Influential Cases 
We next check the sensitivity of our results to exclusion of influential cases. We find 
Pearson residuals after predicting the probability of a conflict where, they are defined to be 
the standardized difference between the observed frequency and the predicted frequency. In 
other words, Pearson residuals measure the relative deviations between the observed and 
fitted values where, large value suggests a poor fit for the corresponding observation 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 9: Pearson residual versus the probability of onset 
 
Also, another statistic that we use to identify outlier observations is the Deviance residuals. 
They measure the divergence between the maxima of the observed and the fitted log 
likelihood functions. As logistic regression follows the maximal likelihood principle, 
logistic regression aims to minimize the sum of the deviance residuals (Figure 10).  
After we find outliers, we check for the observations that have impressive influence on the 
results to see if omitting them from our sample data could change the results. We use Hat 
diagonal (a.k.a. Pregibon Leverage) to measure the leverage of an observation (Figure 11).  
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Figure 10: Deviance residual versus the probability of onset 
 
Figure 11: Leverage versus the probability of onset 
 
We next analyse whether omitting the observations with a large error and/or leverage from 
our baseline model could actually affect our results (Table F). Dropping the observation that 
corresponds to Liberia on 1998, solely results in a big change in the growth significance 
level. This could be due to the high and unusual growth rate (106%) that this country 
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experienced the year before (1997), but it actually accounted for the year 1998 in our model 
– as we gapped our growth data by one year.  
 
6.2. With Respect To Method 
In this sub section we test the sensitivity of our results with respect to the method by 
investigating the significance of results when including time dummies, using random 
effects, and rare-event logistic model. Using fixed effects is not practical in our case as 
many of the variables – including the focus factor – are fixed through time (categorized by 
country) and also, the majority of countries would get ignored form the analysis as the 
dependent variables did not change through the time periods for most of the countries 
(peaceful). We want to analyse whether time effects matter by including time dummies in 
Model G1. Adding year dummies takes into account the fixed intra-year effects besides the 
intra-country fixed characteristics that we are already considering (by clustering). Doing so 
does not change our regressor’s significance, however, it decreases the log likelihood (we 
TABLE F: Outliers and Influential Cases
ModelE1: 
Baseline Model 
ModelE2: Omitting 
odd cases 
ModelE3: Omitting 
influential cases
Population 0.385
***
0.415
***
0.379
***
Peace Years -0.732
***
-0.784
***
-0.734
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.0109
*
0.0120
**
0.0109
**
Regime Durability 0.722
*
0.704
*
0.747
*
Conflict in 
Neighborhood
0.651
*
0.897
**
0.656
*
GDP growth 0.0272 0.0284 0.0434
**
Rough Terrain 0.0212
**
0.0246
**
0.0206
**
Neighbors 
Average Polity
-0.393
*
-0.453
*
-0.399
*
Average 
Temperature
-0.161
**
-0.187
**
-0.163
**
Average 
Temperature^2
0.00161
**
0.00185
**
0.00162
**
Constant -8.005
***
-8.436
***
-7.715
***
Pseudo R^2 0.2938 0.3242 0.2961
Log Likelihood -424.04 -395.1 -422.62
N 3355 3350 3354
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
32 
 
should note that part of this could be because of the omitted observations from excluding 
years 1988 and 2001 due to presence of no event then).  
The results presented in King and Zeng (2001) suggest that standard logit estimation may 
underestimate the probability of an event occurring when the events are rare. As a result, 
Gary King et al. (2003) introduce a new method to use logistic regression when we are 
dealing with very few events (onset of a conflict) compared to non-events. They have 
specifically conducted this method in order to study wars, political activism or 
epidemiological infections. Our data in this research is characterized by a relatively small 
number of events (conflicts), only about five percent of the observations being characterized 
by a conflict outbreak. Moreover, rare-events logit estimates the same model as the logistic 
regression, but with an estimator that gives lower mean square error in the presence of rare 
events data for coefficients, probabilities, and other quantities of interest. After using this 
methodology in Model G2, we do not observe a great change except the first power of 
temperature which becomes significant.  
 
TABLE G: Robustness Checks with Respect to Method 
ModelF1: Pooled Logit 
Plus Time Dummies
ModelF2: Rare 
Events Logit
ModelF3: 
Random Effects
Population 0.388
***
0.378
***
0.403
***
Peace Years -0.746
***
-0.718
***
-0.695
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.0102
*
0.0105
*
0.0115
*
Regime 
Durability
0.770
*
0.726
*
0.785
*
Conflict in 
Neighborhood
0.745
**
0.623
*
0.651
*
GDP growth 0.0264
* 0.0262 0.0267
*
Rough Terrain 0.0203
**
0.0209
**
0.0221
**
Neighbors 
Average Polity
-0.408 -0.384
*
-0.403
*
Average 
Temperature
-0.166
**
-0.161
**
-0.161
*
Average 
Temperature^2
0.00164
**
0.00160
**
0.00164
**
Constant -6.825
**
-7.532
***
-8.710
***
Pseudo R^2 0.3164
Log Likelihood -402.38 -423.66
N 3101 3355 3355
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
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6.3. Armed Forces Personnel variable32 omission 
We choose to omit military personnel data from all the analysis due to three main reasons: 
i. Too many missing variables (Specially in the case of conflict onsets, which is the 
focus of this study) 
In figures 12 and 13, the vertical axis indicates the percent of available observations in the 
dataset we used. Basically, when the value gets bigger, it means the variables cover more of 
the observations. For military personnel data, we could see that almost half of the 
observations are missing when there was no onset and around 40% when there was one. 
Comparing these results with other variables that we used, explains why we decided to drop 
this variable from our analysis. 
ii. There is a good chance that the reason for missing observations be correlated with 
the dependent variable as countries with a rich history of conflict and an instable 
government could either ignore recording their military data or simply would not 
permit access.  
iii. One could argue that military size depends on the risk of conflict (before it even 
happens and reached the benchmark number of deaths) and there could be a high 
level of endogeneity as a result. 
Figures 12 and 13: Percentage of available data (non-missing) by incidence/onset of conflict 
 
However, even after all these we could still test our results including military personnel data 
in the regression models (Table H). You could see the number of observations drops 
dramatically after adding this variable (from around 3500 to 2050) 
 
                                                          
32 Active duty military personnel in thousands 
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7.  CONCLUSION 
All in all, we find evidence that ambient environment factors – such as temperature – could 
have a role in economical/political phenomena. In this study, we realize that some of the 
factors argued to be the most significant in triggering a conflict (from Hegre and Sambanis, 
TABLE H: Including Military Personnel Data in the Models
ModelG1: 
Adding to the 
Initial Set
ModelG2: 
Adding 
Temperature
ModelG3: 
Adding 
temperature^2
ModelG4: 
Adding   
Potential Factors
ModelG5: 
Adding Hot, Mild 
and Cold
ModelG6: 
Adding Cubic 
Latitude
ModelG7: 
Just Minor 
Conflicts
ModelG8: 
Dropping 
Russia
Population 0.272
*
0.237
*
0.296
**
0.381
***
0.274
**
0.334
***
0.265
**
0.265
**
Peace Years -0.854
***
-0.851
***
-0.840
***
-0.854
***
-0.825
***
-0.851
***
-0.791
***
-0.812
***
Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity 
0.0127
*
0.0134
*
0.0125
* 0.00972 0.0111 0.0132
*
0.0123
*
0.0126
*
Conflict in 
Neighborhood
0.858
*
0.836
*
0.796
* 0.705 0.796
*
0.843
*
0.697
*
0.836
*
Rough Terrain 0.0102 0.0149 0.0264
**
0.0250
** 0.0121 0.0160
*
0.0280
**
0.0259
**
Neighbors Average 
Polity
-0.543
*
-0.489
*
-0.553
* -0.468 -0.495
*
-0.598
*
-0.482
*
-0.524
*
Millitary Personnel 0.00029 0.00052 0.000425 0.000352 0.000557 0.000486 0.000023 0.000604
Average Temperature 0.0212 -0.165
*
-0.209
**
-0.169
*
0.0725
**
Average 
Temperature^2
0.00172
*
0.00187
**
0.00172
**
Latitude Yes
%Pop. in Malaria 
Area
Yes
Mean Annual 
Precipitation
Yes
Soil Quality Yes
%Tropics and 
Subtropics
Yes
Mild 1.037
Hot 1.715
*
Latitude 0.117
Latitude^2 -0.00784
**
Latitude^3 0.0000987
**
Constant -6.968
***
-8.836
***
-6.338
** -5.636 -8.579
***
-9.227
***
-5.907
**
-14.00
***
Pseudo R^2 0.3491 0.3485 0.3557 0.3605 0.352 0.3622 0.3017 0.3543
Log Likelihood -265.43 -264.19 -261.26 -257.92 -262.75 -260.11 -258.23 -254.011
N 2038 1994 1994 1953 1994 2038 1994 1987
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p  < 0.05, 
**
 p  < 0.01, 
***
 p  < 0.001
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2006), could actually lose their statistical significance when studying on a different dataset 
(or time period). However, some of the most cited factors stay significant throughout all the 
analysis and robust checks in our work. Focus of this paper is on the possible role of 
ambient factors, not only on individuals, but also on groups – considering conflict as a 
collective group movement. We believe these factors have been omitted from economic 
studies for no good reason. In this work, we propose that temperature could have a 
significant – and positive – effect on starting a conflict not only through change in the 
agricultural production, but also directly by altering the behaviour and mood of individuals. 
This could be of more interest when we argue that increase in violence could be added to 
the negative consequences of global warming. 
To continue, we control for various potentially relevant factors to investigate the existence 
of this direct link from temperature to the onset of conflict by adding them to the model 
including temperature and yet, this variable remains significant throughout the analysis. 
Also, we conduct solid robustness analysis to test the sensitivity of our results to changes 
with respect to both data and method. Moreover, dividing conflicts by their predetermined 
fatality threshold provides us with some new insights. Based on the evidence, we conclude 
that the behavioural effect of temperature on a collective aggressive movement is stronger – 
and more reliable – if we focus just on minor conflicts. One could reason that minor 
conflicts require less preparation and they could happen more suddenly; as a result, 
behavioural factors could influence them more easily.  
Dropping Russia (for the mentioned reasons) from our sample study does not change the 
positive effect of temperature on the conflict onset. However, by studying the shape of the 
relationship between onset and temperature, we learn that northern and southern countries, 
respond oppositely to increase in temperature when the heat exceeds 72.6
o
 Fahrenheit. This 
reminds us the earlier psychological study suggesting individuals could respond reversely to 
increase in temperature when under pressure and the heat passes some measurable point. 
However, this is not the focus of our work and we did not find strong evidence for it. 
In the end, this study tentatively proposes a novel classification system to the existing 
literature in order to group the reasons that could trigger a conflict. This new approach 
keeps the “Greed” motives as one of the main reasons but combines unintentional 
behavioural intentions with “Grievance” motives and labels it as “General Satisfaction”. 
Also, as suggested by Fearon and Laitin (2003), the suitable environment and proper 
conditions plays an important role in insurgency activities and as a result, the third group is 
called “Convenience”.  
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9.  APPENDIX 
Appendix 1 
Here, we have the comparison for some of the factors covered in this study when dividing 
by Northern and Southern part of the world. 
Figure 14: Comparing some of the Northern and Southern countries’ aspects 
 
Figure 15: Comparing some of the Northern and Southern countries’ aspects 
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Appendix 2 
In the following, there is a summary of the variables used in this work. First table illustrates 
all the independent variables and the second one, demonstrates our dependent variable in 
more details. 
 
Table I: Summary of the Explanatory Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population 3355 15.97803 1.546576 12.95768 21.00442
GDP per Capita 3355 7.428245 1.600926 4.054136 11.46363
Peace Years 3355 2.73359 1.161788 0 4.143135
GDP Growth 3355 3.959289 5.432463 -50.2481 106.2798
Ethno-linguistic 3355 41.37019 28.33696 0 93
Participation 3355 3.588674 1.17192 1 5
Regime Durability 3355 0.059719 0.213623 0 1
Polity Neighborhood 3355 -0.09375 0.685237 -2 2
Rough Terrain 3355 15.91123 20.9989 0 94.3
Oil Exporter 3355 0.165425 0.371619 0 1
Conflict Neighborhood 3355 0.633383 0.481953 0 1
Part Free 3355 0.317735 0.465665 0 1
MENA 3355 0.102236 0.303003 0 1
Nineties 3355 0.269449 0.44374 0 1
Temperature 3355 65.89031 14.57696 19.148 82.94
Latitude 3355 0.275305 1852351 0.011111 0.711111
Malaria 3318 0.394585 0.437385 0 1
Precipitation 3355 1132.976 762.3558 31.01 3268.27
Soil Quality 3286 12.43708 9.018787 0 48.1481
Tropics 3286 0.400073 0.424269 0 1
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Appendix 3 
Marginal effects are changes of the dependent variable in response to change in a covariate 
when all the covariates are fixed. 
Figure 16 and 17: Marginal effects for average temperature with and without Russia 
  
 
Table J: The Dependent Variable in More Details
Conflict Onset Freq. Percent Cum.
No Conflict 3,209 95.65 95.65
Minor Conflict 126 3.76 99.4
Major Conflict 20 0.6 100
Total 3,355 100
